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ASEAN’s Role in Shaping Nuclear Security Future in 
the Region 
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Abstract 
The objective of this essay is to discuss the potential future of nuclear security in Southeast 
Asia by examining the roles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
establishing and maintaining regional cooperation on nuclear security. This essay will first 
outline nuclear renaissance and security challenges in the region. It will then discuss the 
steps that have been taken and could be taken by ASEAN to lead the region to a safer 
nuclear security future. 
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Introduction 
The last session of Nuclear 
Security Summit (NSS) held last year was 
not very successful. Similar to the three 
previous sessions, the last NSS only 
produced a toothless joint communiqué 
urging the participating states to maintain 
effective security of all nuclear materials, 
without a legally binding agreement. 
Also, only 19 out of the 56 participating 
states pledged to join some form of 
successor nuclear security conference in 
2018. The NSS was initiated by the U.S. 
President Barack Obama during his 
famous 2009 Prague speech, and largely 
driven by the U.S. However, he had left 
the White House. Will his successor, 
President Donald Trump, make nuclear 
security a continuing priority? If not, what 
will happen to international cooperation 
on nuclear security, especially in 
Southeast Asia where ‘nuclear 
renaissance’ meets a number of serious 
security challenges? 
The objective of this essay is to 
discuss the potential future of nuclear 
security in Southeast Asia by examining 
the roles of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in establishing 
and maintaining regional cooperation on 
nuclear security. This essay will first 
outline nuclear renaissance and security 
challenges in the region. It will then 
discuss the steps that have been taken and 
could be taken by ASEAN to lead the 
region to a safer nuclear security future. 
Nuclear Renaissance and Security 
Challenges in Southeast Asia 
The interest in nuclear energy is 
not new to Southeast Asian nations. It was 
promoted by the U.S. in 1953 through the 
Atoms for Peace program. However, the 
development of nuclear energy has been 
difficult since the region is not only 
subject to large-scale and frequent natural 
disasters, but has also faced various 
political, financial, and technical 
difficulties. This may explain why the four 
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projects to construct nuclear research 
reactors (two in Indonesia, one in 
Thailand, and one in Myanmar) and one 
project to construct a nuclear power plant 
in the Philippines were canceled since 
1971 (CNS, CENESS, and VCDNP, 2012). 
In spite of previous interest, 
Southeast Asia has just recently put 
nuclear energy in its main agenda. There 
are currently sixteen projects to construct 
nuclear power plants by 2025 in the 
region: six in Vietnam, four in Indonesia, 
four in Thailand, and two in Malaysia 
(CNS, CENESS, and VCDNP, 2012). The 
reason behind this ‘nuclear renaissance’ in 
the region is potentially because Southeast 
Asian countries, just like any other 
countries in the world, want to fulfill their 
domestic energy needs and to ensure their 
energy security. Between 2000 and 2013, 
the region’s energy demand has increased 
by approximately 50%. Studies by IEA 
and ERIA (2015) show that the region’s 
total electricity generation will almost 
triple, from 789 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 
2013 to approximately 2,200 TWh in 2040. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam seem to have been driven by the 
rising electricity demand and growing 
dependence on fossil fuels to consider 
restarting the postponed or starting new 
nuclear power plant projects.  
After the 2011 Fukushima incident, 
there was much uncertainty about the 
future of nuclear industry in Southeast 
Asia. Public rejection has been apparent 
especially in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines, but not in 
Vietnam. There is no major public protest 
against the nuclear power plant program 
in Vietnam, a country with single-party 
rule where freedom of speech is very 
limited, if not non-existing. Vietnam was 
progressing much faster than other 
countries in the region in developing its 
nuclear power plant program. In fact, it 
aims to start construction of a Russian-
supplied nuclear power plant in 2019 
(WNA, 2016). However, in November 
2016, the National Assembly of Vietnam 
voted to halt its nuclear power plant 
program due to economic reasons. If the 
halt is to be temporary, and Vietnam’s 
nuclear project runs smoothly and 
successfully becomes a part of the 
country’s energy mix, then other states in 
the region may even follow Vietnam’s 
lead. 
Although currently there is no 
nuclear power plant in operational in 
Southeast Asia, several countries in the 
region possess and use highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and other radioactive 
materials for various purposes as can be 
seen in Tables 1 and 2 (CNS, CENESS, 
and VCDNP, 2012). 
Considering the increased flow of 
nuclear and radioactive materials in 
Southeast Asia, not to mention the 
security challenges the region is facing, it 
is crucial for the region to have a strong 
nuclear security. There are at least three 
main security challenges in the region. 
Firstly, the region is home to a number of 
active terrorist groups, such as Jemaah 
Islamiyah, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid, and 
Abu Sayyaf, not to mention several radical 
groups and clerics that have pledged their 
allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS). Fortunately, they have not 
shown a serious interest to use nuclear or 
radiological materials in their attacks. 
There is also little evidence that they have 
the capacity and the capability to mount 
mass casualty attacks (Liow, 2016). 
However, this situation may change in the 
future. There is a rising fear that ISIS is 
pursuing radioactive materials for its 
attacks, since it has been known in 
November 2015 that some of the group’s 
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operatives have been spying on a senior 
official of SKN-CEN, a Belgian nuclear 
research center (Bunn et. al., 2016). 
  
Table 1. HEU in Southeast Asia 
 
Table 2. Use of Radioactive Materials in Southeast Asia 
 
 
Secondly, Southeast Asia has very 
long land and sea borders, but weak 
border security capabilities. This makes 
states in the region targets for illicit arms, 
drugs, and human trafficking networks. 
Weak border security may also facilitate 
the illicit transfer of nuclear and 
radiological materials. On 13 June 2003, 
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the Royal Thai Police arrested Narong 
Penanam, who smuggled some amount of 
Cesium-137. Such material has long been 
high on the list of security-critical 
isotopes. A similar incident also took 
place in other region just a few weeks 
before the smuggling incident in Thailand. 
The police discovered two metal 
containers of Cesium-137 and Strontium-
90 in Georgia (Ferguson and Andreoni, 
2003). These trafficking incidents indicate 
that smugglers are interested in Cesium-
137, a radioactive material that can be 
used to develop a radiological dispersion 
device (RDD), also known as ‘dirty bomb.’ 
Thirdly, Southeast Asia has 
insufficient export control of dual use 
commodities. Studies by CNS, CENESS, 
and VCDNP (2012) show that the A. Q. 
Khan network was active in or had links 
to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. 
The network employed several firms in 
the region to produce centrifuge parts for 
Libya’s nuclear weapons program. The 
network also transferred sensitive 
commodities through several ports in the 
region. Lieggi (2016) also notes that 
besides the A. Q. Khan network, Iran and 
North Korea have also used ports in the 
region to obtain dual-use commodities. 
Since the region is experiencing nuclear 
renaissance, the flow of dual-use 
commodities is increasing and likely to 
continue to grow in the future. States in 
the region potentially can no longer afford 
to ignore the importance of creating and 
implementing sufficient export control 
enforcement. It is just logical to think that 
an improved export control of dual use 
commodities is strongly needed in the 
region.  
ASEAN’s Roles – Steps Already Taken 
Southeast Asia has an established 
framework for cooperation through 
ASEAN and its subsidiary bodies. They 
have been serving as the primary forum 
for all ten member states to address and 
manage regional hopes and concerns. In 
terms of nuclear security, the regional 
grouping has not considered the issue as 
one of its main priorities. However it has 
developed a number of mechanisms that 
could serve as a model for cooperation on 
nuclear security. 
ASEAN has created a considerably 
useful mechanism for cooperation on 
counter-terrorism and transnational crime 
in the region. During the 7th ASEAN 
Summit on 5 November 2001 in Bandar 
Seri Begawan, ASEAN heads of state 
adopted the Declaration on Joint Action to 
Counter Terrorism, which underscored 
their commitment to combat terrorism in 
the region (ASEAN, 2012a). In April 2002, 
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime held a special 
discussion about proposals on 
information sharing and training of 
counter-terrorism staffs. These efforts did 
not focus on nuclear security issues, but 
they covered customs and border control 
issues as a part of the wider scope of 
counter-terrorism and transnational crime 
activities (ASEAN, 2012b). 
In 2007, ASEAN finalized a 
significant security cooperation agreement 
for the region during the 12th ASEAN 
summit. The heads of state signed the 
ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism 
(ACCT), which serves as a framework for 
regional cooperation to counter, prevent, 
and suppress terrorism and deepen 
counter-terrorism cooperation. The ACCT 
also aims to strengthen preparedness for 
dealing with chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
terrorism. After the ratification of six 
member states, the ACCT came into force 
in May 2011, and it has been ratified by all 
ten ASEAN member states since January 
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2013. Under the ACCT, ASEAN member 
states must take measures not only to 
secure materials that can be used to 
develop CBRN weapons and their 
delivery system, but also to improve 
export control enforcement, as well as to 
prevent CBRN proliferation (ASEAN, 
2012b). This seems to be in line with 
efforts related to the implementation of 
United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, which imposes 
binding obligations on all UN member 
states to adopt legislation to prevent the 
proliferation of CBRN weapons including 
their means of delivery, and establish 
domestic controls over related materials to 
prevent their illicit trafficking (UN, 2004). 
Another mechanism used by 
ASEAN to discuss security matters in the 
region is the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF). Many experts believe that the 
forum is the most appropriate instrument 
for regional initiatives related to nuclear 
security issues (CNS, CENESS, and 
VCDNP, 2012). This forum was 
established in 1994 and aims ‚to foster 
constructive dialogue and consultation on 
political and security issues of common 
interest and concern; and to make 
significant contributions to efforts towards 
confidence-building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region‛ 
(ARF, 2016). The forum does not only 
consist of all ten member states, but also 
ten ASEAN Dialogue Partners (the U.S., 
Australia, Canada, China, India, Japan, 
South Korea, Russia, New Zealand, and 
European Union), Papua New Guinea, 
Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, East 
Timor, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. 
On 2 July 2004, the ARF made its 
first statement on nonproliferation and 
encouraged its participants to improve 
domestic control of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) related materials, to 
cooperate on the prevention of illicit 
trafficking of WMD related materials, and 
to provide technical assistance when 
possible towards these ends (ARF, 2004). 
Within the ARF, there are inter-sessional 
meetings, which discuss specific issues of 
importance to the region every year. One 
of them related to nuclear security is the 
Inter-sessional Meeting on 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ISM-
NPD). This forum discusses 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms 
control issues in the region, as well as 
challenges in implementing the UNSCR 
1540 implementation. In July 2010, the 
Hanoi Plan of Action (PoA) was adopted 
during the ARF meeting in Vietnam. 
According to the PoA, by 2020 the ARF 
should establish a network of law 
enforcement and military agencies for 
information sharing and capacity building 
to respond terrorist threats timely (ARF, 
2010). Given the transnational nature of 
security challenges in the region, the ARF 
is potentially an essential forum for 
discussions about coordinated policies on 
nuclear security issues. 
ASEAN’s Roles – Steps Can Be Taken 
The ASEAN’s cooperative 
framework known as the ASEAN Security 
Community (ASC) can provide a basis for 
facilitating nuclear security cooperation. 
Since all member states possess various 
radioactive materials and there have been 
a number of radioactive trafficking 
incidents in the region, it seems logical 
and wiser to put more attention on how to 
secure radioactive materials and how to 
respond to such radioactive incidents. 
Moreover, considering that the majority of 
nuclear power plant programs in the 
region are still in the early development 
phase, there is a great opportunity to 
establish an effective nuclear security 
culture in the region. 
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In establishing an effective and a 
strong nuclear security culture in the 
region, it is perhaps useful to have 
ASEAN Nuclear Community as the fourth 
pillar of ASEAN Community. Such forum 
can serve as a center for all member states 
to share information, knowledge, and 
experiences regarding nuclear safety and 
security issues. This forum can also serve 
as a coordinating instrument, including 
coordinating training programs for 
nuclear specialists, professionals, 
academia from all member states. 
Although individual member states in the 
region have their own domestic situations, 
it is important for them to engage with 
each other and increase their commitment 
to securing nuclear and radioactive 
materials due to the transnational nature 
of nuclear security challenges in the 
region. 
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